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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review for this 
Court is the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Watson v. Weick, 
141 Idaho 500,504,112 P.3d 788,792 (2005). Summary judgment is proper when "the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law." Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56 (c). If there is no genuine issue of material 
fact, "only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review." Watson, 141 
Idaho at 504,112 P.3d at 792 On appeal from summary judgment, the court will determine 
whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. In making the determinations, it will construe all facts in the record, 
together with all reasonable inferences from the evidence on file, in the light most favorable to 
the party opposing the summary judgment. Smith v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 909,655 P.2d 116 
(Ct.App. 1982), Golbraith v. Vaugas Inc., 103 Idaho 912,655 P.2d 119 (Ct.App. 1982). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
PREFACE 
This is one of two complaints involving access rights across a private roadway that 
crosses the Lawrence's property located approximately four miles south of Post Falls in 
Kootenai County, Idaho. The companion case, Capstar Radio Operating Company. I: Lawveilce 
CV2002-7671, was never consolidated with the instant action as the request for a jury trail was 
overlooked in Capstar, but in fact, requested in the present action.' A motion for summary 
judgment (for both complaints) was heard on November 28,2007 in the District Court of the 
First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, Honorable Judge 
John T. Mitchell presiding. The Pro Se Appellants appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court fiom 
orders entered in the above-entitled action. 
While the two cases are very similar, one important distinction needs to made. In an 
earlier ruling, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that Tower did not have standing to seek quiet title 
as title ownership is a prerequisite to quiet title and Tower is not the record owner of the estate. 
Tower Asset Sub., Znc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710,152 p. 3d 581 (2007). In spite of this ruling, 
in its May 14,2007 Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, Tower continues to pursue quiet 
title action as to the remaining easement theories (which is also one of the issues up for review in 
this appeal.) 
Some of the issues up for review in the instant action are identical to several issues up for 
review in Capstar v. Lawrence, Docket No: 35120. These include the following: 
1) Was summay judgment proper as the defendants made a showing that a genuine issue 
of material fact did exist in the afidavits, pleadings, depositions, and admissions? 
2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refwing to disquulz$ itselffor cause? 
3) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by conducting an independent investigation 
into the defendant's motion for disqualification? 
4) Did the trial court err in determining there was no merit to the defendant's defense of 
latches and statues of limitation? 
5) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admittingplaintiffs afJidavits in their 
entirety over defendant's objections while striking whole paragraphs from the 
defendant's affidavits? 
Because these five issues are applicable to both actions, written argument is presented in 
both Appellant briefs. However, in the interest of brevity, the written argument here remains 
unchanged as to its presentation in Capstar. This brief does not expand on those five arguments 
as the appellants believe that however the Supreme Court rules in Capstar, will most likely be 
adopted in Tower as well. 
Additionally, the August 17, 2007 deposition of Harold Funk remains an essential 
component in establishing several important facts regarding Mellick road, Funk's use of his 
property in Section 22, and his use of Blossom Mountain Road. The entire transcript was filed in 
the present action on September 10,2007 (See Supplemental AfJidavit ofDouglas Lawrence in 
Support of Opposition to Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment R Vol. 2p .  401 7 23) and 
relevant portions of Funk's deposition transcripts were filed with the November 13,2007 
Affidavit of John P. Whelan in Support of Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Renewed Motion 
for Summary Judgment (R Vol. 3 p. 530-539). However, the Appellant's copy of the record did 
not include Funk's deposition transcript in its entirety. As such, some references in this brief will 
cite the deposition transcripts found in the Capstar record. 
BACKGROUND 
On or about July 1996, the appellants, Douglas and Brenda Lawrence, husband and wife, 
purchased eighty (80) acres of remote forest land in an area known as Blossom Mountain located 
approximately four miles south of Post Falls Idaho. On or about October 1997, Nextel 
Communications was granted a Conditional Use Permit allowing them to construct, maintain, 
and operate a cellular communications facility on a portion of a one acre parcel Nextel was 
leasing from Robert and Mark Hall. The following month, (November 1997) the Lawrences 
entered into an (irrevocable) Access License Agreement2 with Nextel West Corp. dba Nextel 
Communications, whereby Nextel Communications agreed to pay the Lawrences a monthly 
license fee in exchange for the Lawrences allowing Nextel and its employees and agents, ingress 
and egress access across the Lawrence property. 
Blossom Mountain is home to other communications facilities operated by other business 
entities; one of which is owned by Capstar Radio Operating Company (Capstar). In the fall of 
2001, a company called Great Northern Broadcasting, Inc., dba Blue Sky Broadcasting, installed 
new broadcasting equipment on Capstar's tower site. The defendants entered into a similar 
Access License Agreement with Great Northern Broadcasting on October 1 1,2001 .3 On 
November 7,2002, Capstar filed a complaint seeking to quiet title an easement access across the 
Lawrences' property. Several months later in June 2003, a company identifying themselves to be 
Tower Asset Sub Inc., and claiming to be the successor in interest to the Nextel Communications 
lease holding on the Hall property, filed a similar complaint seeking to quiet title an easement 
across the Lawrence property as well." Tower initiated this lawsuit seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief by arguing that it had the right to use Blossom Mountain Road to access its 
parcel, and alleged six causes of action to support its position: (1) express easement; (2) implied 
easement; (3) easement by necessity; and (4) easement by prescription, (5) injunctive relief, and 
(6)  breach of contract. 
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiff filed the present action in the District Court of the First Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho on June 27,2003. On July 25,2003, Tower files a motion for a temporary 
restraining order and posts a $3000 bond. On August 17,2004, Tower moves the court to 
summary judgment which is scheduled to be heard on September 14,2004. The Lawrences retain 
John P. Whelan as their attorney and Mr. Whelan files his notice of appearance on September 9, 
2004 along with a motion for enlargement. The motion for enlargement was granted at the 
September 14,2004 hearing and the motion for summary judgment was continued until 
November 9,2004. Because of a discovery dispute, the court ordered that the pleadings, 
discovery, and arguments for summary judgment would be limited to the plaintiffs express 
easement theory. The motion for summary judgment was granted and the order entered on May 
27,2005. On July 7,2005, the Lawrences filed a notice of appeal. The TRO bond posting was 
exonerated back to Tower on July 10,2006. 
The Idaho Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Lawrences and reversed and remanded the 
proceedings back to the district court. The remitter was received by the district court on April 18, 
2007 and the case reopened on April 20,2007. On May 14,2007, Tower renews their motion for 
summary judgment and it is scheduled to be heard on June 13,2007. On May 30,2007, the 
Lawrences file a motion for enlargement. On June 6,2007, the Lawrences file a motion for 
disqualification which is the only motion heard at the June 13,2007 hearing. The court adjured 
without ruling on the motion for disqualification and on June 25,2007, the court enters an order 
denying the motion for disqualification and the motion for summary judgment is rescheduled for 
August 7,2007. On July 9,2007, the Lawrences file a motion to reconsider together with a 
motion for permission to appeal an interlocutory order. These later motions were heard on 
August 6,2007 and the court denied both motions. 
At the August 7,2007 hearing, the court granted the Lawrences' motion for enlargement 
in order to take the depositions of Harold Funk, Robert Hall, John Rook, and Tower Asset and 
the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was rescheduled for September 24,2007. The 
defendants took the deposition of Harold Funk on August 17,2004. However, the defendants had 
difficulty in deposing both Tower Asset and Robert Hall and on September 10,2007, filed 
another motion for enlargement. The plaintips motion for summary judgment was again 
continued to November 28,2007. On November 8,2007, the Lawrences renewed their motion to 
disqualify for cause as well as renewing their motion for permission to appeal &om an 
interlocutory order and these renewed motions were scheduled to be heard on November 27, 
2007. On November 13,2007, the court scheduled a motion to substitute the real party in interest 
to be heard at the November 27,2007 hearing. 
At the November 27,2007 hearing, the defendant's renewed motions were denied and the 
plaintiffs motion to substitute the real part in interest was granted. The plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment was heard on November 28,2007 and again, the motion was granted and the 
order entered on February 6,2008. On March 19,2008, the defendants file a notice to appeal. 
Because the defendants could no longer afford legal representation, the defendants attorney files 
a motion with the Idaho Supreme Court to withdrawal which is granted. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 9, 1969, Harold and Marlene Funk, entered into a real estate contract to 
purchase three parcels of land from Edward and Colleen Raden, and Harold and Viola Marcoe.' 
Parcel A (Government Lot 3), was the Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 
15$ parcel B was the Southeast Quarter of Section 21;' parcel C consisted of the Southwest 
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter (Section 22) and the Southwest Quarter of Section 22, except 
for an approximately one acre lot which had been previously separated from the land and sold to 
General Telephone Corporation, all located in Township 50 North, Range 5 West, Boise 
Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho.' Parcel B abuts Parcel C to the west and Parcel A abuts 
Parcel C to the north forming one large contiguous land e~ ta t e .~  A statutory warranty deed for the 
above described parcel was conveyed to the Funks on April 11,1974." The Funks purchased the 
land for investment purposes." There were very few merchantable timber on the land when the 
Funks purchased it.12The Funk Estate, which consisted of previously harvested or burned forest 
land," was wild, open, unimproved land located generally on top of Blossom Mountain.14 
There were two roads entering the Funk Estate: Mellick Road, apublic road, entered the 
Funk Estate in Government Lot 3, Section 15 from the north," and apvivate easemeat road 
which leaves Signal Point Road (to the west) and entered the Funk Estate in Section 21.j6 
On July 1, 1975, the Funks entered into a real estate contract, as sellers, with Human 
Synergistics, Inc., a Minnesota Corporation, as purchaser, of the Southeast Quarter of the 
Southeast Quarter of Section 21, Township SO North, Range 5 West." The warranty deed 
conveying title to Human Synergistics is dated October 29, 1992." (The east half of this parcel, 
would later become the Lawrence parcel, the subject of this complaint.) 
Between the time the Funks purchased the land in April 1969 and the time they sold the 
land in Section 21 to Human Synergistics in 1975, Funk's use and enjoyment of their property 
generally involved the picking of huckleberries and target practice19 in the Southwest Quarter of 
the Southeast Quarter in Section 2120; more specifically, the land that lies directly west of the 
land currently owned by the La~rences.~' During this approximately six year the Funks 
made approximately 20-30 trips to the top of the m~untain.'~ 
The private easement road known as Blossom Mountain Road, begins at its departure 
from Signal Point Road in the Southwest Quarter of Section 2lZ4; travels in a south-easterly 
direction into the Northeast Quarter of Section 28 before turning and traveling in a north-easterly 
direction and entering the south property line of Funk's land in the Southeast Quarter of Section 
21? The road extends east across the Southeast Quarter of Section 21 where it enters the 
Southwest Quarter of Section 2226. Soon after entering Section 22, Blossom Mountain road 
dividesz7 with the main body of the road continuing in a Northeasterly direction where it 
eventually turns into Mellick R0ad.2~ A spur continues to travel in a westerly direction where it 
ends near the Nextel Site in Section 22?9 After leaving Signal Point Road, Blossom Mountain 
road crosses two privately owned parcels of land that were never owned by the Funks or the 
Funks predecessor in interest to the Funk estate.30 The Blossom Mountain Road access was 
gated3$ in the Southwest Quarter of Section 21 and appears to have been locked from as early as 
196632 and requiring the use of a key for access.33 According to Funk, GTE gave him a key to 
the gate.34 Wilber Mead also testifies that his gate was locked until October 1998.35 (There is 
nothing in the record that contradicts Funk's permissive use of Blossom Mountain Road.) 
In November 1972, Wilber and Florence Mead grant the Funks an ingresslegress 
easement to use the road as it crosses the Southwest Quarter of Section 21 .36 Wilber Mead did 
' 
not own any land in the Northeast Quarter of Section 28 and did not, nor could not, grant the 
Funks the right to use the road as it crosses into Section 28.'" Funk was also aware that the 
Meads did not own land in Section 28.38 Funk never attempted to contact the owners of the land 
in Section 28 for an easement.39 Funk testifies that they generally didn't cross through Section 
28."ORather, they cut over prior to entering Section 28 on a spur that led to the top of the 
m~untain.~' There is nothing in the record to show that Funk had any ingresslegress rights on 
Blossom Mountain Road as it crosses the Northeast Quarter of Section 28."' On the contrary, the 
record actually testifies to the lack of an easement thereof.43 Don E. Johnston and Fern A. 
Johnston, together with John McHugh and Mary Ann McHugh, were predecessor in interest to 
the Lawrence land44. In July 1977, Idaho Forest Indusbies (then owner of the Northeast Quarter 
of Section 28), grants the Johnstons and McHughs an ingresslegress easement over said North- 
east Quarter of Section 28."' Without this easement, the Lawrences would be devoid of a legal 
access to Signal Point Road. 
In the fall of 1975, Mr. Funk moves to the American FallsiAberdeen area46; Mrs. Funk 
moves the following June.47 After 1975, Funk only visits the mountain 2-3 more times4' and 
never visits his remaining property afier 1981 .99 
The chain of title with respect to the subject property in Section 21 from Funk to the 
Lawrences is recited in the trial court's February 6,2008, Memorandum Decision and Order 
Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to 
Substitute Real Party in Intere~t.~' The chain of title with respect to Tower's leased property in 
Section 22, is recited in the trial court's February 6,2008, Memorandum Decision and Order 
Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to 
Substitute Real Party in Interest." 
On November 1 1, 1997, the Lawrences enter into an Access License Agreement, as 
Licensor, with Nextel Communications, Inc., as Licensee, where by the Licensee agreed to pay 
Licensor regularly monthly license fees for an ingresslegress access across the subject property 
and permitting them access to their leased lands in Section 22.52 In January 2003, the Lawrences 
received a letter from Spectra Site, informing the Lawrences that Nextel has assigned their rights 
in and to the Nextel Access License Agreement to Spectra Site.53 In August 2005, the Lawrences 
receive a letter from Spectra Site informing the Lawrences that Spectra Site has merged with 
American ~ o w e r : ' ~  In April 2007, the Lawrences receive a letter from American Tower offering 
a Lump Sum payment option for the License payment.s5 The Lawrences testify that they never 
received any correspondence from Nextel, Spectra Site, or American Tower indicating that 
Tower Asset Sub Inc. in any way benefits from the Nextel License Agreements6 The Lawrences 
also testify that they have never received any payments from Tower Asset Sub., Inc.; they have 
never seen any vehicles or individuals who claim to work for them; they have no knowledge of 
Tower ever using the road; and outside of this complaint, have never heard of Tower Asset Sub., 
I ~ c . ~ '  The Lawrences also testify that at all times since the inception of the Nextel License 
Agreement, Nextel and/or their successors, have been in possession of a key to the Lawrence 
gate and have used the road as it crosses the Lawrence's property permis~ively.~~ The Lawrences 
also testify that they have never done anything intentionally to interfere, restrict, or prevent 
Nextel's or Spectra Site's use of the roadway.59 
Tower's un~euij?ed~~ complaint alleges that it has a vested leasehold interest in certain real 
property leased from Robert No evidence has been offered in support of this allegation. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the trial court erred in its interpretation of the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in 
Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, and in concluding that the Idaho Supreme Court had 
previously determined that Tower's landlord (Hall) has easement rights to the Lawrence parcel? 
B. Were the proper causes of action in Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Renewed motion for Summary Judgment properly set before the court? 
C. Did the trail court abuse its discretion by granting summary judgment when the 
defendants made a showing that a genuine issue of material fact did exist in the affidavits, 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions? 
D. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify itself for cause? 
E. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by conducting an independent investigation into 
the defendant's motion for disqualification? 
F. Did the trail court err in determining there was no merit to the appellants defense of 
latches and statute of limitations? 
G. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting Plaintiffs affidavits in their entirety 
over defendant's objections while striking whole paragaphs from the defendant's affidavits? 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
The Lawrences are seeking the award of attorney fees on appeal as Tower has filed and 
prosecuted this complaint fkivolously. The fact is, Tower Asset Sub., Inc. and Spectra Site 
Communications have not been truthful with the courts. They have engaged in false accusations 
and misrepresentations. They have breeched the contracts they entered into with the Lawrences. 
They have conspired with Capstar to use the court as a tool to pressure the Lawrences into 
acquiescing property rights. They have engaged in a corporate ball-n-cup game to frustrate the 
Lawrences' discovery attempts and they have so misrepresented the Idaho Supreme Court's 
decision in Tower v. Lawrence, as to cause significant additional wsts and delay to the 
Lawrences. 
Daniel Rebeor, the Director of Real Estate Operations for Spectra Site offered an 
affidavit in July 2003. In it, Mr. Rebeor states that Nextel West Corp. entered into an Access 
License Agreement with the Lawrences in an @ort to avoid l i t i ~a t i on .~~  Mr. Rebeor was not an 
employee of Nextel West Corporation and cannot testify as to Nextel's intentions some six years 
after the fact. This statement is an obvious attempt to mislead the court. He further states that the 
Defendants have rehsed to allow plaintiffs access to the site.63 This statement simply is not true64 
as the Lawrences never interfered with Nextel's or Spectra Site's use of the road.65 The fact is, 
Nextel West contacted the Lawrences in I997 seeking an Access License Agreement prior to 
their construction of a cellular tower on Blossom Mountain. Prior to that initial contact, the 
Lawrences had never heard of Nextel. There was no threat of litigation as the Lawrences weren't 
even aware of Nextel's plans or intentions on Blossom Mountain. 
The Lawrences will argue that Tower either has conspired with Capstar, or is working in 
i 
I 
I conjunction with Capstar to use these lawsuits to ruin the Lawrences financially and pressuring 
I  
them into acquiescing property rights. Nextel negotiated an Access License Agreement with the 
i 
i 
I Lawrences in 1997 and made regular monthly payments on the Access License Agreement for 
i 
I nearly six years before filing this ~omplaint .~~ Capstar files their complaint against the 
I Lawrences in November 2002 and Tower files the present action several months later. It begs the 
i 
i question, why would Tower choose to file a complaint then and not some years earlier if they 
i 
I believed they were entitled to access rights? Is it also just a coincidence that Tower retains Susan 
i 
I Weeks as legal consul; the same attorney that is representing Capstar? Is it also a coincidence 
i that both cases get assigned to Judge Mitchell? Is it also a coincidence that Judge Mitchell 
happens to be a personal friend of Susan Week's law partner Lee James?" The Lawrences 
! contend that these are not isolated coincidences. Rather, they certainly demonstrate corporate 1 
i cooperation between Tower and Capstar. A cooperation that also extends to and includes Spectra 
1 Site, Great Northern Broadcasting, Trinity Broadcasting, and possibly Nextel and Robert Hall as 
I I 
I well. 
Tower has completely frustrated the Lawrences attempts at taking discovery by playing 
some ball-n-cup or hide-n-seek game. First, is the issue of who has the leasehold interest in the 
Hall parcel and who is in possession of the Access License Agreement across the Lawrences' 
land. Tower's unverified complaint (the statute of frauds requires all leasehold interests over one 
year to be in writing) asserts that Tower is in possession of the leasehold interest in the Hall 
property. After some six years of litigation with the Lawrences raising this issue on multiple 
occasions, Tower still has failed to produce any writing demonstrating their rights to the Hall 
property. One must ask the question, why isn't Tower's landlord pursuing this action or even 
- 
named as a party in the complaint? 
Additionally, the Nextel Access License Agreement does provide that Nextel can assign 
the License to a company that acquires a 51% or more share of the assets of Ne~tel .~ '  But that is 
not what we have here. Nextel continues to use the road access to support their equipment on 
Blossom Mountain and Tower has not produced any evidence whatsoever that they have 
acquired a 5 1% share in Ne~tel .~'  
The record will reflect that there was a problem taking Tower's deposition as well as the 
deposition of Robert Hall, which resulted in the filing of a Motion for Enlargement and a Motion 
to Compel." Robert Hall could not be served after six attempts over an eleven day period and 
Tower repeatedly canceled scheduled depositions. Ultimately, the person Tower produced for 
deposition could not testify about important facts relating to Tower." 
We also ask the Idaho Supreme Court to consider Tower's pross misinternretation of 
Tower Asset Sub., Znc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 152 p.3d 581 (2007), the first issue up for 
review in this appeal, as another example of Tower's calculated and frivolous pursuit of this 
action. 
Finally, one must also question why, just days before the hearing, Tower moves the court 
to substitute Spectra Site as being the real party in interest. This complaint has been in litigation 
for some six years. From the various pieces of business correspondence in the record7', it would 
appear that Spectra Site has been driving this litigation a11 along and Tower Asset Sub Inc. is 
little more than a name on paper, a corporate entity created for convenience. Was it to Erustrate 
the Lawrences' discovery attempts? Or, is it so Spectra Site can claim no responsibility and no 
culpability for the way this complaint has been so frivolously prosecuted? 
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court erred in its interpretation ofthe Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in 
Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 152 P.3d 581 (2007), and in concluding that 
the Zdaho Supreme Court hadpreviously determined that Tower's landlord (Hall) has easement 
rights to the Lawrence parcel. 
The district court determined that the Halls, (who were not a party to the present action) 
had an easement over the Lawrences' land established by prior use, by necessity and by 
pre~cription.7~ In its decision, the district court rationalizes that a portion of footnote language 
published in Tower Asset Sub., Znc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710,152 P.2d 581 (2007), 
establishes an easement for Hall. The trial court concludes: 
The Idaho Supreme Court noted on appeal that Tower Asset had already 
established that the Halls (and thus, Tower Asset) were intended to have the right 
to use the easement. The Idaho Supreme Court noted in footnote 1 that: "Tower 
presented uncontroverted evidence that the Hall parcel was intended to have the 
benejt of the access road across the ~awrence~arcel .  " 
The district court reinforces this finding by determining: 
" . . . the analysis above as to Capstar's easement by implication fvom prior use, 
easement by necessity and easement by prescription, applies to the  hall^.'^ 
When Tower filed its August 17,2004. Motion for Summaw Judgment, it sought to 
establish an easement for itself through four causes of action: (1) express easement, (2) implied 
easement, (3) prescriptive easement, and (4) easement by necessity. The trial court then ordered 
the parties to limit their discovery, briefing, and arguments to the issue of express easement and 
therefore did not address the other causes of actions. The trial court found in favor of Tower that 
an express easement existed and the Lawrences appealed that judgment. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed only three issues: (1) whether Tower has 
standing; (2) whether Hall is an indispensable party; and (3) whether the district court erred in 
declaring the existence of an express easement on summary judgment. These are the only three 
issues the Supreme Court took up. As the Supreme Court noted in its opinion, Hall was not a 
party to the suit. The issue as to whether or not Hall, Tower's landlord, had established an 
implied easement by prior use, or through necessity or through prescription was simply not 
before the Supreme Court at that time. 
The Supreme Court also noted that the district court had ordered the parties to limit their 
discovery, briefing, and argument to the issue of express easement only. Because the defendants 
were ordered by the district court to limit their discovery to the issue of the express easement 
only, they were denied the opportunity to present any evidence contesting the plaintiffs claims 
on the other easement theories and in that regard, any evidence Tower had in the record in 
support of the other easement theories would have been uncontroverted. 
The dishict court simply took the Supreme Court's footnote out of context. The Supreme 
Court was using the footnote to draw the distinction between the intent of the parties and what is 
required to establish an express easement. Said another way, an express easement can only be 
created by a written instrument. Intent to use an easement does not in and of itself, create an 
express easement. 
What is of particular interest is that neither Tower in its briefings, nor the district court in 
its decision ever reconciled this argument with the Supreme Court ruling in the companion case 
Capstar Radio Operating Company v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704 152 P.3d 575. Capstar involved 
the same disputed easement, the same original landowners, the same easement theories and the 
same controlling issues of law. It begs the question(s), how could Supreme Court have found an 
easement exists for the benefit of Halls and not for Capstar? Why would the Supreme Court 
remand one case back to hear remaining easement theories and remand the other back only to 
make a determination on injunctive reliei? 
In its earlier ruling, the Supreme Court opinioned that they agree with the Restatement 
(third) of Property that an individual has standing to enforce the right to use an easement if he or 
she has the right to benefit from the easement. Restatement of (Third) of Property 5 8.1 (2000) 
. . . Tower derives its right to use the alleged easement from its lmsor, Hall. Tower will have 
standing to seek injunctive relief if it cun establish it (Hall) has an alleged legal right to bene$t 
@om the Blossom Mountain Road easement. Tower Asset Sub., Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 
152 P.2d 581 (2007). 
Tower failed to produce any evidence that the Halls have any easement rights to the 
Lawrence property. Rather, Tower errs in its interpretation and reliance on the earlier Supreme 
Court ruling by asserting that the only issue on remand was whether Tower Asset, as a tenant, 
has a legal right to benefit from the Blossom Mountain Road easement of its landlord, Halls. 
That is the argument Tower makes in their August 2; 2007, mcrnorandum in support of renewed 
motion for s m a r y  judgment and that is the argument the district court adopts in granting 
Tower summary judgment?' Tower failed to make any other showing that Hall is entitled to 
benefit from the Blossom Mountain Road easement. The trial court erred in its conclusion that 
Halls have easement rights to the Lawrence parcel and summary judgment should not have been 
granted in favor of Tower. 
21 The proper causes of action in Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment were not properly set before the court? 
In an earlier ruling in Tower v. Lawrence, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that Tower 
does not have standing to pursue a quiet title action as title ownership is a prerequisite to quiet 
title and Tower is not the record owner of the property.I6 Yet, Tower continues to pursue other 
easement theories. 
On May 14,2007, Tower renewed the motion for summary judgment that they submitted 
on August 17,2004 without anv changes or modifications. In the accompanying Memorandum 
in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, Tower claims that the Supreme Court 
concluded that : 
Tower will have standing to seek injunctive relief if it can establish it has an 
alleged legal right to benefit from the Blossom Mountain Road easement ... This 
renewed summary judgment raises for the Court's consideration those other 
theories o f  easement raised by Plaintiff in its comnlaint. Although contained in the 
original summa ry judgment, for ease of argument, this memorandum reiterates 
those facts and armments vreviously raised. Emphasis added. 
Tower then argues at some length the other easement theories that were included in the 
original motion for summary judgment concluding that 'yor the foregoing reasons and under the 
foregoing legal theories, the Court should grant Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment." 
The Lawrences filed their opposition to Tower's motion for summary judgment on July 
24, 2007.77 In it, the Lawrences argue among other things, Tower's lack of standing to quiet title 
citing the previous Supreme Court's ruling that Tower does not have standing to quiet title. 
Tower never corrects or nor modifies its motion for summary judgment. Rather, on 
August 2, 2007, Tower offers Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment in which Tower now asserts that the Supreme Court noted that Tower on 
appeal already established that Hall had the right to use the easement: 
Although Tower's inifial brief set forth theories under which Hall had 
easement rights, the recitation was not necessary. The Idaho Supreme Court on 
appeal noted that Tower Asset Sub Inc. on appeal had already established that 
Hall had the right to use the easement. Spec$cally, the Supreme Court noted in 
footnote 1 that "Tower presented uncontroverted evidence that the Hall parcel 
was intended to have the benefit of the access road across the Lawrenceparcel. 
However, that does not establish an express easement, which must be created by 
written instrument. " Id  at 584. . . . Thus, the law of the case as established on 
appeal is that Hall was intended to have the benejt of the Blossom Mountain road 
easement across the Lawrences 'parcel. Lawrences ' may not attack this finding on 
remand. It was also established that Tower is a tenant ofHall, and Lawrences may 
not attack this finding on remand. Thus, the only issue remanded by the appellate . 
court was whether Tower, as a tenant, has the legal right to benejt from the 
Blossom Mountain Road easement of its landlord, Halls. ... Therefore, Tower is 
entitled to injunctive 
At hearing, Tower fbrthers this argument by saying 
"Okay. Your Honor, when I f i s t  renewed the motion for summary judgment I was 
sloppy. It did not go back to the Supreme Court language and identify what the 
directives were on remand. In both my first reply brief and my szpplemental reply 
brief I have done that, and the Supreme Court was very speczjic on what they are 
sending this case backfor. They noted in a footnote that there S not a dispute that 
Hall has a right to user the road, and I believe they did that based on 
augmentation of the record they requested at the Supreme Court level from 
another case that has not been augmented to this court, but they put that right in 
the opinion that Hall has the right to use the road.. . What they do say is that we 
can't quiet title of course in Tower Asset, now Spectra Site. They remand it and 
say what this court is to look at is with Hall having a right to use the road, what 
are the rights of .... the new Spectra Site."79 
What was before the trial court for summary judgment and what was granted to the 
plaintiff in the summary judgment is not entirely clear. In its decision, the trial court makes the 
following statement "Tower Asset has made itperfiectly clear that it is seeking injunctive relief 
in the case, and that Tower Asset is not making any claim to title over Lawrence's land. '"O Yet, 
later in the decision the court concludes "On remand, Tower Asset renews its motion for 
summary judgment based on the other theories of easement previously raised in their 
complaint. " The court further states "Additionally, the analysis above as to Capstar's 
easement by implication from prior use, easement by necessity and easement by prescription, 
applies to the Halls. 'j8' The trial court appears to be contradicting itself. 
Of interesting note is the fact that in the district court's decision granting summary 
judgment in favor of Tower, the court decides that Tower hasproven that they are entitled to 
injunctive reliej Yet, the court either consciously or unconsciously stops short of providing the 
injunctive relief Tower sought in its summary judgment motion. One can only speculate as to 
whether this was intentional or an oversight on the part of the trial court. However, on its face, it 
places the appellants in a truly legal dilemma. Are the appellants enjoined from restricting 
Tower's access? If the renewed motion for summary judgment sought to provide injunctive relief 
and doesn't, then what is the effect of the summary judgment other than in establishing an 
easement for the benefit of the Halls and Halls' tenants? The trial court order granted Tower's 
Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, yet the effect of the order remains unclear. 
The Supreme Court ruled that Tower does not have standing to seek quiet title to the 
Lawrence property. Tower's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment sought injunctive relief 
based on easement theories not available to Tower. Tower's landlord Hall, was not a party to this 
case. The remaining causes of action available to Tower were not properly before the court in the 
renewed motion for summary judgment. 
III. Summary judgment was not proper as the defendants made a showing that a genuine 
issue of material fact did exist in the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, and admissions. 
Summary judgment should not be granted if reasonable people could reach different 
conclusions or draw conflicting inference from the evidence, as summary judgment is proper 
where the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact. Farm credit of Spokane v. 
Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,869 P.2d 1365; Rule 56(c), Idaho R. Civ. P 
Summary judgment is only proper if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on the 
file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56 (c). 
If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, the trial court should grant the 
motion for summary judgment. Farm Credit Bank v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,272,896 P.2d 
1365, 1367 (1 994). If the non-moving party does not come forward with evidence as provided in 
1.R.C.P 56(c), then summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party. Meik1e 
v. Tovvy Watson, 138 Idaho 680 (2003). Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the 
moving party when the non-moving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential 
to that party's case upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Meikle v. Torvy 
Watson, 138 Idaho 680 (2003). 
Where a jury has been requested, the non-moving party is entitled to the benefit of 
reasonable inference drawn from the evidenciary facts. Ambrose ex. Rel. Ambrose v. Buhl Joint 
School District No. 412,126 Idaho 581,887 P.2d (Ct.App. 1984) 
Facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary 
judgment and he is to be given the benefit of all favorable inferences which might be reasonably 
drawn from the evidence. Jones v. Jones, 100 Idaho 510,601 P.2d 1 (1979) 
Much of the plaintiffs claimed easement theories and much of the court's analysis and 
conclusions, rests in large part, on the affidavits produced by Harold Funk, John Rooke, and 
Robert HaIl. The court summarily rejects the defendants evidence as being insufficient to show a 
genuine issue of material fact and granted summary judgment to the plaintiff. 
In the courts written decision, the court sets forth its analysis of the plaintift's various 
claimed easement theories and offers the specific evidence the court relies upon in developing its 
conclusions of law. For the most part, the court is silent on the defenses rebuttal evidence. The 
defendants took the deposition on Harold F u d 3  and John Rook.84 The entire deposition 
transcripts are attached the September 10,2007 affidavit of John Whelan. 
The trial court's written decision lists approximately twenty-six findings of fact that the 
court relies on in granting summary judgment to the plaintiff. Is some cases, it is apparent that 
the court plainly had its facts wrong?' Generally, the court just summarily dismissed the 
appellants evidence and completely ignored the areas where the deposition testimony either 
contradicted or offered explanation to the affidavits of Harold Funk and John Rook. 
IV. The trial court abused its discretion by refwing to disqualzfi itseEffor cause. 
Public confidence in judicial system is undermined when citizenry concludes, even 
erroneously, that cases are decided on basis of favoritism or prejudice rather than according to 
law and fact; because concern is the appearance of partiality, this concern is not overcome by 
recusal. Matter of Disciplinary Proceeding Against Niemi, 820 P.2d 41,117 Wash.2d 817 
Test for determining whether judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, such 
that a judge should he recused, is an objective test that assumes that a reasonable person knows 
and understands all the relevant facts. CJC 3(D)(1). Sherman v. State, 905 P.2d 355, 128 
Wash.2d 164, reconsideration denied, and amended. In determining whether a trial judge should 
be disqualified, inquiry is not only whether there was an actual bias on judge's part, but also 
whether judge's conduct or words created "such likelihood of bias or an appearance of bias that 
judge was unable to hold balance between vindicating interest of court and interest of accused. 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend 14. State v. Garza, 865 P.2d 463,125 Or.App. 385, review denied 876 
P.2d 783,319 Or. 81 
Even in the case in which a judge may be convinced of his or her own impartiality, the 
appearance of bias or prejudice can so undermine litigants confidence in proceeding or public's 
confidence in system as to require judges disqualification. Corniskey v. District Court In and For 
the County ofPueblo 926 P.2d 539, Rehearing denied. 
Due process, the appearance of fairness, and the Code of Judicial Conduct require 
disqualification of a judge who is biased against a party or whose impartiality may reasonably be 
questioned. CJC 3(D)(1). Woljkill Feed and Fertilizer Covp. v. Marhn, 14 P.3d 877, 103 
Wash.App. 836. "Bias" requiring change of judge connotes leaning of mind or inclination toward 
one person over another. Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 40.1(b)(2) Brown v. Avery, 850 P.2d 612, 
1 Wyoming 1993. The truth of the filed affidavit charging bias or prejudice on the part of the judge 
I 
! 
I is not what disqualifies the judge, but the affidavit itself. Price v. Featherson, 64 Idaho 312,130 
I 
P.2d 853. The Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3 states a judge shall perform the duties of 
I  judicial office impartially and diligently and a judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a 
proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be que~tioned.~~ 
I 
The appellants sincerely and truthfully believe a strong bias or prejudice exists with the 
i 
trial court and that the proceedings are prejudiced against the appellants and the appellants legal 
consul and is biased to favor both plaintiffs Tower and Capstar. The appellants are entitled to a 
I fair, just, and impartial proceeding and are absolutely and undeniably convinced, that after nearly 
seven years of litigation in Capstar and nearly six years of litigation in Tower, and tens of 
thousands of dollars in legal fees, that the trail wurt has not been an impartial trier of facts. 
Having the experience of being in front of the district court now for seven years in Capstar, and 
six years in Tower, a pattern of favoritism andlor prejudice emerged, which when taken 
collectively, would give reason to question the courts impartiality. 
John P. Whelan offered several affidavits that established grounds by which the court was 
biased against him andlor his representation of the appellants. The record speaks for itself in that 
regard. Not so obvious are all the individual actions in the proceedings, findings, rulings, and 
conclusions that the appellants question and have not yet enumerated. Listed herewith, are a 
portion of those specific actions that causes the appellants to question the wurts impartiality. 
Initially in Capstar, the appellants were Pro Se. A hearing was held on Capstar's motion 
for summary judgment. The Lawrences moved the court to provide an enlargement of time 
because Capstar had not provided timely answers to defendants admissions, interrogatories, and 
demand for production. Furthermore, the answers Capstar did provide were vague and 
questionable. Rather than grant an enlargement of time to allow the Lawrences ample time to 
dispute the facts, the court just ruled on the issue of express easement. The Lawrences presented 
good facts concerning the express easement which were summarily dismissed by the wurt with a 
total disregard to Lawrences' arguments regarding the express easement theory. The court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Capstar, in part by finding that the sales agreement and 
deed were unambiguous. 
Facing a similar upcoming hearing on Tower's motion for summary judgment, the 
defendants retained John P. Whelan who represented them at hearing. Mr. Whelan explained to 
the court the doctrine of merger and presented good arguments against Tower's express easement 
theories. Lawrences' arguments were again, summarily overruled. The court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Tower, this time finding the deed to be ambiguous. 
The defendants appealed both decisions and on appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court found in 
favor of the defendants, reversing the court's order and remanding it back fur fbrther 
proceedings. In a footnote in the Tower opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court even questions how 
the court could conclude the deed to be ambiguous in one case and unambiguous in another. 
The court received the remitter on March 30,2007 and reopened the case on April 20, 
2007. On May 30,2007 Capstar renewed their motion for summary judgment which was 
scheduled to be heard on June 13,2007. On June 6,2007, the Lawrences properly file a motion 
for disqualification for cause together with the affidavit of John P. Whelan and the motion was 
heard on June 13,2007. The affidavit and oral argument offered facts surrounding Yovichin v. 
Bush, CV-01-2116; a case involving both the court and the appellant's attorney John P. Whelan 
and in which the court disqualified himself for yet unexplained reasons. Also offered were facts 
surrounding Sauls v. Luchi, CV-04-1616; Stvaub v. Smith, CV-04-5437 (Supreme Court No. 
3 1955); Kvivor v. Rogers, CV-06-6252; and Metvopolitan Pvoperty 41. Causality v. Allen, CV-06- 
6358; all cases in which the defendants believes demonstrates a particular bias the court has 
against Mr. Whelan. 
Rather than determine the legal sufficiency of the motion for disqualification, the court 
simply withheld judgment and adjured "to take a closer look." On June 27,2007, the court 
published a rather detailed written decision in which the court simply refutes each and every fact 
or charge. A truly impartial court should be truly impartial as to its role as the trier offact. The 
fact that the court put so much energy into refuting the charges and defending itself is a clear 
indicator that the court is no longer impartial. It clearly demonstrates that the court has a stake 
in the proceedings that it wishes to defend. 
The appellants also offer the fact that the attorney for both plaintiffs, Susan Weeks, is a 
partner of Leander James, a personal friend of the court as well as the current president of the 
Idaho Trial Lawyers Association; facts which the court affirmss7 even while denying the 
appellants motions for disqualification. 
On October 31,2007, a hearing was held in the present case. Capstar moved for a motion 
to shorten time and application of a sixth access. At hearing, many issues were raised by John 
Whelan, specifically with regards to the motion including the lack of a supporting affidavit, 
failure to cite a rule, the lack of a bond posting, and in particular, the lack of a preliminary 
injunction order.88 Mr. Whelan argued that there was no preliminary injunction outstanding. 
That the preliminary injunction was superseded by a permanent injunction when the court 
granted summary judgment and which also resulted in the bond being exonerated back to the 
plaintiff. Later, when the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the district courts summary judgment 
and remanded the case back, the permanent injunction was overturned because the order creating 
the judgment was overturned. At no time did Mr. Whelan say that the Supreme Court overturned 
the PreliminaryInjunction. Prior to making a ruling, the court recessed to review the language of 
the Supreme Court opinion and upon its return, the court accused Mr. Whelan for not being 
truthful to the courts9 in making a claim that the preliminary injunction was reversed. The court 
totally misconstrued what Mr. Whelan presented and was in error in accusing Mr. Whelan of not 
being truthful to the court. The court's response to Mr. Whelan illustrates that the court just didn't 
disagree with Mr. Whelan's argument; the court has taken direct issue with Mr. Whelan's 
credibility and his truthfulness. It can be argued that this action on the part of the court is 
indicative of an underlying current of animosity and/or contempt either against the appellants or 
Mr. Whelan. 
Later in this brief, the Lawrences are asking the Idaho Supreme Court to review the trial 
court's acceptance and review of evidence. More specifically, the court's whole-hearted 
i 1 acceptance of the plaintiffs affidavits in their entirety over Lawrences' objections and the striking 
I 
1 of whole paragraphs from the defendants' affidavits. Furthermore, the courts written decision is 
fundamentally silent of the evidence submitted by the defendants. The court doesn't even attempt 
I 
to reconcile the contradictory facts offered by Tower's own witnesses, Harold Funk and John 
! Rook. Rather, the court remains silent as if the evidence doesn't exist. The Lawrences put in a 
I significant cost and effort in taking Mr. Funk's testimony to resolve questions raised by Mr. 
Funk's affidavit and to get Mr. Funk's recollection of events. However, Mr. Funk's deposition 
I 
I 




silent on the facts established by the deposition. Rather, the court predominantly cites the 2004 
I affidavit of Harold Funk in,its decision in favor of the plaintiff. 
The appellants were sued by both Tower and Capstar over each and every easement 
theory available and over the course of these proceedings, the trial court had determined that 
both Tower (or Tower's landlord) and Capstar had express easements, implied easements by 
prior use, easements by necessity, and prescriptive easements across the appellants land. How is 
this possible? If one has an easement by necessity or implied by prior use that is established at 
conveyance, then how does one's use of a property ripen into prescription too? And, how is it 
possible that one's use of their own property can ripen into a prescriptive use? 
Much of the court's analysis regarding the various easement theories don't make any 
sense at all. The court continues to find, among other things, that the Funk did reserve for 
themselves an easement across the now Lawrence parcel. "Funks actually did take great care to 
reserve an easement across the parcel he sold to Human Synergistics in 1975; however, they 
errantly put that language in the sales agreement. That is why there is no express easement. " 90 
This statement certainly fails to reflect the true opinion of the Idaho Supreme Court. 
The trial court also argues that the appellants assertions (in Tower) that Tower lacks 
standing to pursue easement theories of implication or necessity is without merit. Evidently, the 
court did not read the earlier Idaho Supreme Court decision on Tower as the appellants were only 
restating the ruling made by the Idaho Supreme Court. If the trial court is not going to honor the 
decisions and directives of the Idaho Supreme Court on remand, then the Lawrences cannot 
possibly receive a fair and just trial. 
The appellants have correctly raised issues where the court impartiality might reasonably 
be questioned and the wurt should have disqualified itself from these cases. The trial court 
abused its discretion by refusing to disqualify itself for cause. 
V: l7ie trial court abused its discretion by conducting an independent investigation into 
the defendant's motion for disqualification. 
The commentary to Canon 3 of the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge must 
not independently investigate facts in a case and must consider only the evidence presented. '" 
Mr. Whelan set before the court, facts involving six cases where the court's impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned in this case: Yovichin v. Bush, Sauls v. Luchi, Stmub v. Smith, 
Capstar v. Lawrence, Tower Asset Sub Znc, v. Lawrence, and Krivor v. Rogers. The facts 
surrounding the Yovichin v. Bush, CVOl 21 16, raises questions surrounding Judge Mitchell's 
I 
i voluntary disqualification then, and whether the reasons he voluntarily disqualified himself from 
that case, still exist today. 
In the court's June 25,2007 decision, the court speculates that a more likely reason the 
court voluntarily disqualified itself in Yovichin, may have dealt with the facts surrounding the 
Matter of the Estate of Dianne Rothe, Kootenai County Case No. SP 675. The court 
acknowledges that it reviewed the court file in that case.9' 
The Matter of the Estate of Dianne Rothe was not part of the appellant's briefing, 
testimony, or oral argument. There was no evidence before the court relating to the Estate of 
I Dianne Rothe. Rather, the court conducted an independent investigation of the motion before the 
court, produced findings regarding that investigation, and rendered those findings in support of 
the courts decision to deny appellants motion. 
In the appellants renewed motion for disqualification (heard August 6,2007), the 
appellants argued that it was improper for the court to conduct an independent investigation into 
any issue pertaining to any pending litigation. The court did not write on the issue. Neither did 
the court provide any authority relating to the issue of the court's investigation into the Rothe 
case. In concluding remarks, the court offers that it has not researched the easement issue; 
suggesting that the disqualification issue isn't relevant to the pending litigation or encompassed 
by the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct. 
VI. The trail court erred in determining there was no merit to the appellants defense of 
latches and statute of limitations. 
On September 10,2007, the appellants amended their answer to include the additional 
defenses of latches and statue of limitation. Capstar's complaint makes no reference to its 
predecessor's interest. Yet, Capstar seemingly alleges that its predecessors in interest acquired 
rights to use the Lawrence parcel and that those rights somehow inure to to the benefit of 
Capstar. Yet, Capstar has offered no evidence on the subject. If Capstar's predecessors had any 
rights to use the road, those claims are now stale and barred by the statue of limitations. 
Whether or not a party is guilty of latches is ordinarily a question of fact. Osterloh v. 
State of Idaho, 100 Idaho 702,604 P.2d 716. It is beyond question that the Lawrences have been 
prejudiced by the alleged stale claims which Capstar now seeks to enforce. If Capstar's 
predecessors truly enjoyed easements by implication, necessity, and/or prescriptive use, those 
claims by Capstar's predecessor should have been perfected through litigation, especially where 
they relate to implied easements and easements by necessity. The failure to pursue claims by 
plaintiffs predecessor has clearly prejudiced the ability of the Lawrences (and Lawrences' 
predecessors) to defend against the claims. In the present action, the Lawrence parcel was 
created in 1975, some 34 years ago. Claims of implied easement and easement by necessity 
should have been perfected years ago. 
VII. The trial court abused its discretion by admitting Plaintzys afidavits in their 
entirety over defendant's objections while striking whole paragraphs from the defendant's 
afJidavits. 
The courts mlings on admissible portions of affidavits appears to be inconsistent and 
biased in favor of the plaintiff. On August 7,2007, the court heard several motions to strike 
portions of affidavits submitted by both Capstar and Lawrence. The Lawrences sought to strike 
objectionable portions of the affidavits of Susan Weeks, Harold Funk, John Rook, and Robert 
Hall and Capstar sought to strike portions of Lawrence's July 24,2007 affidavit. 
Lawrences' motion to strike identified nine items in the Funk affidavit, eight items in the 
Rook affidavit, eight items in the Hall affidavit, and ten items in the Weeks affidavit. The motion 
itself specified the objectionable items and stated the grounds for each objection. 
At hearing, each and every objection the Lawrences raised to the affidavits of Funk, 
Rook, Hall, and Weeks were summarily rejected by the court and the affidavits were admitted by 
the court in their entirety. 
This is in stark contrast to the July 24,2007 affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in which 
whole paragraphs were deemed inadmissible. Rather than point to or identify the objectionable 
portions of the paragraph, the plaintiff just moved the court to strike entire paragraphs as being 
inadmissible. Those include paragraphs 8,23,24,49,51,52,54,61,67,68,75,76,77,78,79, 
80,81, 82,83,84,85,86, and 87. Other paragraphs in which the relevant portions of the 
paragraph were stricken include: 9, 1 1, 18, 19,20,44,57,58, and 59. The Lawrences also 
submitted additional affidavits which the trail court appears to have either summarily rejected or 
summarily ignored. 
CONCLUSION 
Private individuals are at a huge disadvantage defending lawsuits filed by large 
corporations and corporations know this. If corporations don't have the law on their side, they 
simply drag the litigation on year after year, draining the financial resources of those they oppose 
until they either acquiesce or simply run out of money. Most people cannot fix their own 
garbage disposal, let alone defend themselves against a staff of corporate attorneys who know 
how to play the legal system like a finely tuned violin. Corporations get away with it because 
they can. They know there are little to no repercussions. 
The Lawrences are not attorneys and do not pretend to be. They are simply fighting for 
their rights with everything they have. It is not our choice to be Pro Se Appellants and it is 
certainly not an easy thing to do. In defense of these complaints we have had to make significant 
sacrifices in order to just pay our attorney. At times, we had to pay the attorney before making , 
mortgage payments and our house ended up in foreclosure. We've even had to rob the children's 
college fund to pay the attorney. Our credit is mined and we have absolutely no idea how we are 
going to pay for our children's college tuition. 
Tower and Capstar are on Blossom Mountain for one reason - to make money. They 
have absolutely no other interest. They didn't buy their land to raise a family and realize a dream. 
They have no personal feelings or personal investment in the land. They don't labor over it to 
maintain it. They're not up there pulling weeds, trimming trees, scraping roads, buildinglmending 
fence, protecting the wildlife, building habitat, or chasing off hunters and illegal trespassers. To 
them, everything simply comes down to the making of money and they are not going to let 
anyone stand in the way of that pursuit. 
Nextel asked the Lawrences to grant them use of their road to access their tower site, 
which the Lawrences did in good faith. Some six years later, Tower conspires with Capstar to 
sue the Lawrences to pressure them into acquiescing their property rights. All they would have to 
do is to wear them down and force them ixito financial ruin. And, as long as the complaint 
appears legitimate, they will suffer little to no repercussion for forcing this family into financial 
hardship. What difference is it to them if the Lawrences loose their house or cannot pay for their 
children's college education? 
The Lawrences have been wrongfully enjoined. Their property rights have been taken. 
They have been stripped of every semblance of right, justice, and impartiality by a trial court that 
obviously has ulterior motives. For seven years, they had to worry and stress over how they are 
going to defend this action and their rights. They don't even remember the last night they were 
able to sleep through the night without waking up worrying about the litigation. 
The Lawrences now indulge the Idaho Supreme Court to make a final disposition of this 
complaint by dismissing all of Tower's claims and awarding attorney fees to the Lawrences. We 
also ask for an award of all fees, penalties, damages, sanctions, and fines that the Idaho Supreme 
Court deems to be just, equitable, and within the law and jurisdiction of the Idaho Supreme Court 
to grant, which may include: 
An award of no less than $60,000 in fines, penalties, and damages for the Lawrences 
being wronghlly enjoined and restrained. 
An award of no less than $30,713.41 in principle and interest in lost license revenues for 
the period beginning June 2007 when Spectra Site just quit making the Access License 
payments. 
An award of no less than $45.75/day for trespass damages for every day since the filing 
of this litigation on June 27,2003. This amount represents an amount that is equal to the current 
daily license fee as Nextel negotiated with the Lawrences. 
Lastly, an award equal to the total compensation package of the CEO of Spectra Site 
since June 2003, or $5,500,000, whichever is largest, for actual and punitive damages sustained 
by the Lawrences in defending this frivolous complaint. Tower should be made to realize that big 
corporations have moral and ethical boundaries. And, there are significant consequences for 
stepping over those boundaries. 
Brenda J. Lawrence Dated: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this =day of March, 2009, I caused to be served two (2) true 
and correct copies of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur dlAlene, Idaho 83814 
Via: U S  Mail, postage prepaid 
Facsmile: (208) 664-1684 
- Personally served 
' Appellants never received clarification as to what effect consolidating would have on their 
jury trail. 
Nextel Access License Agreement (R Vol. 3 p. 519-524). Nextel and its successor in interest 
in the Access License Agreement are currently in breach of the terms of the license 
agreement. 
Great Northern Broadcasting, Inc. Access License Agreement (R Vol. 2 p. 208-213). Great 
Northern Broadcasting is currently in breach of the terms of the Access License Agreement. 
The Lawrences have been sued by North American Cellular (later AT&T), Kootenai Electric, 
and Verizon previously over this road and all were settled prior to going to trial. See Affidavit 
of Douglas Lawrence. (R Vol. 2 p. 396 73)  
RadensIMarcoes to Funk Real Estate Contract, Exhibit B, 17 August 2004, Affidavit of Susan 
Weeks in Support for Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Attached to Funk's deposition (herein referred to as FD) as Exhibits 1 and 2 (R Vol. 2 p. 424 
& Capstar R Vol. 2, p. 388-389) are photocopies of the relevant portion of a Metsker Map 
dated March 1959. Exhibit 1 has the Funk Estate highlighted with a yellow highlighter. 
Exhibit 2 has the Funk Estate denoted with a pen-line drawn around the boundary of the 
parcel. During Mr. Funk's deposition, Mr. Funk was presented with Exhibit 1 and validates 
the highlighted area as correctly denoting the properties they purchased (FD 11:21-12:3 
Capstar R. Vol. 2, p. 359 and FD 23: 18-24:4, Capstar R Vol. 2, p. 362). For clarification, the 
highlight in Exhibit 1 and the pen-line in Exhibit 2, encompasses the SE ?4 of Section 21, the 
SW ?4 of Section 22, the SW ?4 of the NW ?A of Section 22, Govt. Lot 4 in Section 22, and 
Govt. Lot 3 of Section 15 which abuts Govt. Lot 4 to the north. 
See endnotes 5 & 6. 
See endnotes 5 & 6. 
See endnotes 5 & 6. 
' O  RadensIMarcoes to Funk Warranty Deed, Exhibit C, 17 August 2004, Affidavit of Susan 
Weeks in Support for Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I '  FD 11:25-12:7 (See Capstar R Vol. 2 p. 359) 
l2 FD 12%-12:17 (See Capstar R Vol. 2 p. 359) 
'"ee prior endnote. 
l4 Court's Finding (R Vol. 3 p. 638 L. 20-21) "This isn't the type of property of which one would 
expect daily use. The property is on top of a mountain." 
l5 At issue in the instant action is whether or not Mellick Road provided access to the Funk's 
land. Mellick Road was made a county (public) road by action of the Board of County 
Commissioners for Kootenai County on or about October 8, 1907. See Viewers Report and 
Plat of Survey, Book 288 Page 586, records of Kootenai County (R Vol. 2, p. 283-302). The 
survey of Mellick Road was performed by the County Surveyor, W.H. Edelblute and 
completed Aug. 19, 1907 (R Vol. 2, p. 296) The Plat of Survey (R Vol. 2, p. 298) clearly 
establishes Mellick Road as extending into and through the SW ?4 of Section 15 and more 
particularly, through the SW ?4 of the SW % (Government Lot 3) of said Section 15. On April 
13, 1987, District Judge Gary M. Haman, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment in 
Loudin v. Stokes, Case No. 65077 (R Vol. 2, p. 284, L.18-25) issues the following: 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Mellick Road, as described in the Survey of Mellick Road, and Branch of Mellick 
Road; Survey and Notes by Col. W. H. Edelblute, April 1910, notes recorded in 
Book 288 of Deeds, Page 568, Instrument No. 765281, records of Kootenai 
County, is, and it is hereby declared to have at all times been a public road in 
general ..." 
In reading the court's decision for summary judgment Id. 283, the court based its decision on 
the affidavit of James P. Meckel, a professional engineer, who used data obtained from the 
original 1910 centerline survey and a computer to generate a scale drawing of what the 
dedicated Mellick Road should look like, then compared that to an aerial photograph of the 
actual roadway, after which he opinioned with "reasonable engineering certainty" that the 
Mellick Road as surveyed by Edelblute is identical with the existing road on the Loudin 
property. (R Vol. 2, p. 287 L.lO-17). On June 28,2007, Bruce Anderson, the Kootenai 
County Surveyor, in affidavit, provides his opinion, that Mellick Road did extend into the 
land owned by the Funks and would have provided them with a legal ingress and egress (R 
Vo1.2 p. 280-282). All the above testimony is consistent with and collaborates the relevant 
portions of the March 1959 Metsker Map (Exhibits 1 and 2, Funk Deposition) illustrating 
Mellick Road as it extends into Funks land. At deposition, Funk identifies the road as a 
logging road FD 58:l-14 (R Vol. 3, p. 537) and establishes that the road passes through 
Government Lot 3 FD 59:7-9 (R. Vol. 3, p. 537). Funk also establishes that the road was there 
when he purchased the property FD 15:24-16:4 (See Capstar R Vo1.2, p. 360) and that it was 
in fact a road FD 15:ll-17 (See Capstar R Vol. 2 p. 360). 
l6 Commonly known as Blossom Mountain Road and sometimes referred to as the GTC or GTE 
road. See FD 14:4-14:5 (See Capstar R Vol. 2 p. 360) This private easement road was in use 
at the time by the General Telephone Company to access their one acre parcel laying in the 
Southwest Quarter of Section 22. The record includes a deed where in a predecessor in 
interest of the Funks granted an easement over the portion of Blossom Mountain traversing 
the Lawrence property to the General Telephone Company of the Northwest. That deed, dated 
October 16,1996, benefited the property owned by General Telephone in the Southwest 
Quarter of Section 22, hut not the Hall Property. (Tower Asset Sub., Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 
Idaho 710,152 P.3d 581 (2007)) 
" Funk to Human Synergistics Sale Agreement, Exhibit E, 17 August 2004, Affidavit of Susan 
Weeks in Support for Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Funk to Human Synergistics Warranty Deed, Exhibit I, 17 August 2004, Affidavit of Susan 
Weeks in Support for Motion for Summary Judgment. 
l9 FD 25:ll-18 (R Vol. 3 p. 532) 
FD 50:13-51:7 & 51:19-25 (R Vol. 3 p. 535) & FD 56%-57:5 (R Vol. 3 p. 536-537) together 
with Exhibit 2, (R Vol. 2 p. 424) 
'' See prior endnote. 
'' FD 25:ll-25:23 (R Vol. 3 p. 532) 
23 See prior endnote. 
24 Court's Finding. (R Vol. 3 p. 619 L. 19-23) together with FD Exhibit 2 (R Vol. 2 p. 424) 
25 See prior endnote. While this portion of Blossom Mountain Road has never been surveyed, it 
is undisputed that Blossom Mountain Road crosses the Northeast Quarter of Section 28 prior 
to entering the Southeast Quarter of Section 21. 
26 See endnote 24. 
27 See September 10,2007 Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in support of Opposition to Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 1, Image #1 (R Vol. 2 p. 404) at place-mark #13. A 
photograph of this division is attached as photo #13, Id. 418. 
28 FD 58:l-59:lO (R Vol. 3 p. 537) together with Exhibit 2, (See Capstav R Vol. 2 p. 389). 
September 10,2007 Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in support of Opposition to Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment, 1 16 (R Vol. 2 p. 399) The areas depicted in the photographs 
labeled 1A through 22 are identified by the place-marks in Images 1 through 8 and clearly 
illustrate travel from Mellick Road all the way to Signal Point Road. In 1975, this portion of 
the road appears to have been overgrown FD 153-23 (See Capstav R Vol. 2 p. 360) and Funk 
just chose not to use it. FD 16:2-9 (See Capstar R Vol. 2 p. 360). Funk was going to open up 
the road, but never did. FD 58:ll-59:2 (R Vol. 3 p. 537) 
29 See September 10,2007 Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in support of Opposition to Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 1, Image #1 (R Vol. 2 p. 404) road ending at place- 
mark labeled Nextel Site. 
30 See endnote #25. In regards to the Northeast Quarter of Section 28, see FD 55:3-55:5 (R Vol. 
3 p. 536). Plaintiff has shown no unity of title in regard to the Southwest Quarter of Section 
21, therefore the inference would be correct. 
31 FD 18:10-19:14 (R Vol. 3 p. 531) 
" Affidavit of Wilber Mead (R Vol. 2 p. 202 7 3) 
33 FD 18: 1- 192  (R Vol. 3 p. 53 1) See prior endnote. 
34 FD 26:2-27:25 (R Vol. 3 p. 532) 
35 Affidavit of Wilber Mead (R Vol. 2 p. 202 7 3) 
36 Affidavit of Wilber Mead (R Vol. 2 p. 202 74) 
37 Affidavit of Wilber Mead (R Vol. 2 p. 202 75) 
FD 52:16-52:18 (R Vol. 3 p. 535) 
39 FD 54:l-54:13 (RVol. 3 p. 536) 
40 FD 56:17-23 (R Vol. 3 p. 536) 
41 FD 55:6-57:12 (R Vol. 3 p. 536) together with exhibit 2 (R Vol. 2 p.424) 
42 Capstar has not produced any evidence that they have such rights. If the Funks had access 
rights, the Johnstons and McHughs would not have to acquire an easement from Idaho Forest 
Industries. 
43 See endnote #42. 
44 See Exhibits F, H, G, and I to Affidavit of Susan Weeks filed March 9,2004. 
45 AS recorded as Instrument No. 773361 (R Vol. 2 p. 517) Exhibit A to Affidavit of Douglas 
Lawrence in Opposition to Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. 
46 FD 29:21 (R Vol. 3 p. 533) 
47 FD 29:22-29:24 (R Vol. 3 p. 533) 
48 FD 30:2-30:15 (R Vol. 3 p. 533) 
49 FD 313-31:17 (R Vol. 3 p. 533) 
February 6,2008, Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Real Party in Interest (R Vol. 3 
p. 620-621) 
" id. 621-622 
Access License Agreement, Exhibit B, Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. (R Vol. 3 p. 519-524) 
53 Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence (R Vol. 2 p. 314 7 42, with attachment R Vo1.2 p. 217) 
54 Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence (R Vol. 2 p. 314 743, with attachment R Vol. 2 p. 218) 
" Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence (R Vol. 2 p. 314 7 44, with attachment R Vol. 2 p. 219) 
56 Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence (R Vol. 2 p. 3 14-3 15 7 45) 
" Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence (R Vol. 2 p. 3 14-3 15 7 45) 
58 Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence (R Vol. 2 p. 3 15-31 6 7 48) 
59 Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence (R Vol. 2 p. 374 7 30) 
60 The statute of fiauds requires leaseholds in duration of one year or more to be in writing. 
Idaho Code 9-503 
Plaintiffs complaint p. 1 f 1 
62 f 3, July 22,2003 Affidavit of Daniel E. Rebeor in Support of Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order. 
63 7 7, July 22,2003 Affidavit of Daniel E. Rebeor in Support of Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order. 
64 July 24,2007 Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence 748 (R Vol. 2 p. 315-316) 
65 Of interesting note is that Capstar does not accuse the Lawrences of restricting their access, 
only Tower. It doesn't stand to reason that the Lawrences would block the access of a 
company that entered into an Access License Agreement with them and are paying them for 
access and not restrict the access of a company that is not paying them a license fee. 
66 Nextel or their successor breached the Access License Agreement in 2007 soon after Spectra 
Site offered the Lawrences a Lump-Sum payment for the License Agreement 
67 Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion for Disqualification for Cause I.R.C.P. 
40(d)(2), (R Vol. 1, p. 106 L. 17-1 8) 
68 Access License Agreement (R Vol. 2 p. 224 7 2) "Assignment: Licensee mav not be ass i~n  or 
othemise transfer all or anv uart of its interest in this License or in the Licensed Area 
without the ~ r i o r  written consent ofLicensor; provided, however, that Licensee may assign its 
interest to its parent company, anv subsidiaw or affiliate or to any successor-in-interest or 
entity acguirinp fifty-one aercent (51 %) or more o f  its stock or assets. 9 ,  
69 The Lawrences have counter-sued for breech of contract as the License requires the written 
consent of the Lawrences before Nextel can assign the License. 
70 Affidavit of John P. Whelan in Support of Motion for Enlargement and Motion to Compel (R 
Vol. 3 p. 433-450) 
71 TRVol. 1 p. 165:12-166:s 
72 July 22,2003 Affidavit of Daniel E. Rebeor in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order, January 13,2003 Spectra Site Letter (R Vol. 2 p. 217), Undated Spectra Site 
correspondence sent prior to September 15,2005 (R Vol. 2 p. 218), April 16,2007 
correspondence from American Tower (R Vol. 2 p. 219), and oral argument TR Vol. 1 p. 
162:ll-169:4 
73 R V01.3 p. 652 7 2 &Id. 653 7 5 
74 R V01.3 p. 652 
75 R V01.3 p. 650 7 2 
76 Tower Asset Sub., Znc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 152 p.3d 581 (2007) 
82 R Vol. 3 p. 652 
83 See Capstar R Vol. 2 p. 356-399 
84 See Capstar R Vol. 2 p. 400-430 
8s Nextel assigned the Access License Agreement to Capstar (R Vol. 3 p. 636 L. 25) and that 
Funks used the property for the six years from the time Funk sold to Human Synergistics till 
he left the area. (R Vol. 3 p. 638 last 9 
86 Commentary to Cannon 3 
87 RVol. 1 p. 106L. 17-18 
88 See Capstar TR Vol.1 123:2-125:6 
89 See Capstar TR Vol.1 129:23-25 
90 R Vol. 3 p. 632 L. 1 1-13 
91 R Vol. 1 p. 101 L. 12-16 
